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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

E. J. :MAYHEW,
Plaintvff-Respovndent,

Case
vs.
No.134849

STANDARD GILSONITE COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLAN·T'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF T·HE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to set aside a default judgment
rendered against the appellant and based upon an action
by the plaintiff respondent alleging that the contract

is void, illegal and unenforceable.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court granted a default judgment on
February 23rd, 1962, and on that same day, the defendant appellant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. Said motion was properly supported by evidence,
which motion was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks vacation of the judgment, and
judgment remanding the case back to the District Court
for trial on its merHs.
S'TATE~IENT

OF FACTS

A complaint was filed by the plaintiff on January
30th, 1962, alleging that a contract entered into by and
between the plaintiff and defendant July 2nd, 1958, was
illegal, void and unenforceable, and therefore the defendant should return to the plaintiff patent rights which
had been assigned by virtue of the July 2nd, 1958 contract, and should he enjoined fron1 further using the
patent in the operation of defendant's business. As a
second cause of action that the contract in question was
alleged to have been breached.
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The contract of July 2nd, 1958 was attached and made
a part of the plaintiff's complaint. The contract was
prepared in part at least, by plaintiff's attorneys and
certainly with their approval, as within the document
itself Plaintiff's attorney is specifically named. Under
the terms of the contract in question the plaintiff received
10,000 shares in Standard Gilsonite Company stock valued
at $2.00 per share, $15,000.00 cash, and royalties in the
sum of $19,000.00. Although the contract is alleged to be
void and unenforceable, the plaintiff has not tendered or
offered to return the benefits received under the contract.
On January 18th, 1962, R. J. Pinder, President of
Standard Gilsonite Company resigned as President of
the corporation by sending formal notices to the existing
director, officer, and substantial stockholdeTs. Thereafter on February 1st, 1962, a Mr. B. F. Romono personally served R. J. Pinder as officer and President of
the corporation, although at the time of service R. J.
Pinder clearly informed Romono that he was no longer
President, or associated with the corporation. At this
time the corporation was without formal management
or authorized leadership whatsoever, and the 3,000 shareholders, most of whom lived out of the State of Utah,
were at the mercy of the Plaintiff seeking to enforce his
claims against the corporation. On February 16th, 1962,
the firm of Jensen, Jensen & Bradford was contacted by
a group of interested stockholders in order to determine
what could be done to protect the corporation, pending
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reorganization. Said counsel attempted to contact R. J.
Pinder and obtain the necessary information with which
to protect the corporation against the complaint herein
involved. That on the 16th day of February, 1962, R. J.
Pinder, in the presence of attorney William Bradford,
contacted by long distance telephone certain shareholders
of the defendant corporation, for the purpose of establishing Jensen, Jensen & Bradford's authority to properly
represent the defendant corp.oration in the action. Because of the delay in getting the necessary information
from the stockholders in distant parts of the United
States, it was not until February 23rd, 1962 that the necessary information, documents, and authority to actively
enter the law suit were available to the legal counsel.
On February 23rd, 1962, a judgment and decree was
entered in the Third Judicial District Court against the
defendant. On February 23rd, 1962, the same date on
which the judgment vvas entered, Jensen, Jensen & Bradford called and as:ked respondent counsel for a chance to
plead, and was denied this, and advised that the default
judgment had been entered a few hours earlier. Immediately Jensen, Jensen & Bradford filed with the Clerk of
the District Court a n1otion and notice that the default
judgment theretofore entered upon that date, be set
aside. The 1notion was supported b~T an affidavit properly
executed by R. J. Pinder, and a n1esne assignment by
which patent rights clailned by the plaintiff were assigned
to Halliburton Company by the defendant. On March 7th,
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1962, at 2 :30 p.m., the motion was heard. However, it was
continued until March 14th, 1962, at which time, despite
the fact that it was not only apparent that there were
meritorious defenses, but there was also a serious question as to jurisdiction having been obtained over the defendant corporation, the Court denied the defendant's
motion to set aside the judgment. However, it should
be noted that the Court itself comments, at page 16 in
the transcript of Beaver Dam Sales vs. Standa;r.d Gilsonite, a con1panion case, also on appeal at this time, that
the case should (emphasis added) be placed on the trial
calendar.
A substantially identical case involving the same
primary parties is now before this Court, entitled Beaver
Dam Sale.s Company v. Standard Gilsonite Company,
and it would he well to examine the transcript in that
case, because it involves substantially the same testimony
and is based upon the same affidavits and proof as the
instant case and was treated in conjunction with this instant case by the lower court, and should be so treated
now.

STATEl\fENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND WAS IN
ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN NOT SETTING ASIDE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
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POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDIGTION IN THAT
THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY SERVED.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT BASED UPON FINDINGS OF AN ILLEGAL
CONTRACT, PREPARED BY THE PLAINTIFF HIMSELF,
WITH MUTUAL PARTICIPATION, AND STILL ALLOWING
HIM TO R.ETAIN $54,000.00 IN PROFIT, AND GRANTING
JUDGMENT WHICH RETURNED THE PA'T'ENTS WHICH
WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL CONTRACT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND WAS IN
ERROR AS A MAT'TER OF LAW IN NOT SETTING ASIDE
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT.

By the rules in this State, the attitude and policy
relative to the setting aside of a default judgment are
codified with the purpose in mind of guiding the trial
court in the use of its discretion. Quoting in part the
phrases from Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:
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"On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect ... '' (Emphasis added.)
Considerable importance should be attached to the
words ''excusable neglect." The definition given to the
word ''neglect'' in vVebster's Collegiate Dictionary, 5th
Edition, is "to omit to notice, to be remiss in attending
to, or fail to do, care for." This fairly contemplates that
that which has been done, or not done, as in the instant
case, is remiss to one's responsibilities, but in the interest
of justice and fairness, the law deems it fair to excuse
neglect or failures which are not unreasonably gross.

It is further implied and made factual by the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the functions
of which was to remove many of the technical difficulties
involved in pleading, and to avoid the inequities resulting
frmn a failure to properly adhere to the rather stringent
rules of code pleading, by which, in years gone by, many
law suits were won and lost.
The law in Utah, by the statutes, by the rules, and
by the cases, clearly leans toward the equitable position
and attitude that a case should be heard on its merits.
Our Supreme Court in Bylund

'V.

Crook et al., 208 P. 504,

states at page 505:
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''Our trial courts are usually very liberal in
vacating and setting aside default judgments entered against a defaulting party by reason of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or in case
.where there has been fraud or deceit practiced.
Under our practice it is generally regarded as an
abuse of discretion for a trial court not to vacate
and set aside a default judgment when there is
any reasonable gro?.tnds for doing so, and timely
appl~cation is made." (Emphasis added.)
This statement expresses the policies enumerated
above, and the basic policy of our Supreme Court in dealing with the setting aside of default judgments. In the
case with which we are here concerned, certainly no reasonable person could contend that timely application was
not made for the setting aside of the default judgment.
The necessary motion and supporting affidavit, together
"\Yith additional documents, were filed on the same date
that the default judgment was entered.
Certainly it is recognized that the moving party
should he diligent and show that he was prevented from
avoiding the default judgment because of circumstances
over which he had no control. In this regard, the Court
states in TVat-ren v. D.ixon Ra'Jl.ch Company et al., 260 P.
2d. 7+1, at

page7-t~:

''Discretion must be exercised in furtherance
of justice and the court will incline toward granting relief in a doubtful case to ~he end that a party
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rnay have a hearing: Hurd v. Hurd, 74 Utah 46,
276 Pac. 908. However, the movant must show
that he has used due diligence and that he was
prevented from appearing by circumstances over
which he had no control. Peterson v. Crozier, 29
Utah 235, 81 P. 860."
The use of the term ''no control" in the foregoing
case, certainly when alined with the phrase "excusable
neglect" fairly implies that the term ''circumstances over
which he had no control" does not mean that the only
thing that will constitute circumstances over which he has
no control would be an act of God, or the term "excusable
neglect" would be meaninglness. It is apparent, in the
instant case, that trial counsel was diligent in attempting
to protect the interest of his client, the defendantappellant herein. As mentioned in the affidavit which is
a part of this record, in paragraph 4 defense counsel indicates that he was unable to obtain readily information
relative to the position of the defendant in this law suit
until February 16th, 1962. Immediately thereafter he
attempted to contact R. J. Pinder, the former President.
After finally getting him into the office, long-distance
telephone calls were made in order to get the necessary
documents, papers and information with which to properly represent the defendant. On the 23rd day of February, 1962, the default judgment was entered. The defense
counsel called plaintiff's counsel to request an opportunity for smne additional time in which to responsively
plead, and was advised that a default judgment had been
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entered hours prior, and immediately counsel for the appellant filed a motion to set aside the judgment. It is
certainly not a situation where counsel should be condemned for not taking what is customary action, which is,
inviolation of rules and attitudes of the Court of this state
and others, of filing a general denial of the allegations of
plaintiff's complaint in order to stall, giving him sufficient opportunity to obtain the facts. Rather, defense
counsel endeavored to bring before the Court a legitimate
defense but Vi/as delayed in obtaining the same.
It is to be borne in mind, and certainly brought to
the attention of the Court and to plaintiff-respondent's
counsel, that there were no officers or directors legally
qualified in the State of Utah, and that of the approxiInately 3,000 shareholders nearly all of them resided
outside of the State of Utah. There was no active management. There was no one ''rith responsibility to give
orders, and there was no one to whom legal counsel
could turn when decisions had to he made relative to answering and responding in litigation, and no readily available source frorn which the infonnation could be obtained
to present a meritorious defense.
By the time a reorganization con1mittee was formed
by a group of stockholders to protect the defendant corporation, the default had been entered. Certainly, circumstances of the kind herein alleged were considered when
Rule 60 (b) was drafted. Therefore, the Supre1ne Court
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in the instant case, should find that Rule 60(b) is applicable in both sub paragraphs 1 and 7, and that in either
case the trial court, in the equitable and fair use of its
discretion, should have granted the motion for the setting
aside of the default judgment.
In the case of Cutler v. Haycock, 90 P. 897, a case
somewhat similar was appealed to the Utah Supreme
Court. In this particular case the plaintiff filed a complaint in an action of replivin. The twenty days for answering expired on December 1st, 1905. On December 1st,
the defendant's attorney mailed a demurrer. The demurrer did not arrive until December 4th because of the slow
mailing services in the southern part of Utah. On December 2nd the plaintiff's attorney entered a default
judgment. Prior to the entering of the default judgment,
the defendant himself asked the plaintiff's attorney not
to enter a default judgment because his attorney was
preparing the necessary papers and would send him
copies. However, the default was entered. Subsequently,
the defaulted defendant's attorney filed a motion to vacate the default judgment. The Court stated at page 900:
"As has been well said in all doubtful cases
the general rule of courts is to incline towards
granting relief from the default and to bring about
a judgment on the merits."
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Continuing on, the Court said at page 900:
"This rule, as appears from the authorities, is
of ahnost universal application, and is defeated
only in eases where the default is the result of inexcusable neglect of the party in default, or where
it would be inequitable to set it aside." (Emphasis
added.)
The Court then went on to state that the trial court had
abused its discretion in not setting aside the default because of the following reasons:
The appellant had made reasonable efforts to
comply with the law. (Emphasis added.)
1.

2. ~The case arose in a sparcely settled country
where communications were slo·w. (Note: Even if fast,
would have arrived a day, or at least hours late.)
3. Good faith and reasonable effort to make a defense are always elen1ents to be considered in each case.
4. There is not the slightest intimation that the
respondent would have suffered either inconvenience or
loss of any kind by setting aside default.
5. This was not a case where a party at great expense and saerifice of time had prepared for trial and
would be compelled to undergo it all again if the other
party is pennitted to defend.
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6.

It is not a case where any evidence has been lost

to the prevailing party.
Answering point by point the foregoing issues made
in the case of Ctdler v. Haycock and applying the·m to the
instant case:
1.

·The diligence and reasonable efforts to comply

with the law are apparent.
2.

Although the case· did not take place in a sparcely

settled country all of the truly interested parties of the
defendant were over a thousand miles away and many
miles apart in distant areas of the United States.
3.

Good faith and reasonable efforts to make a de-

fense are present and will be set forth in some detail in
the second and third arguments of this brief.
4.

There is no allegation or intimation that the re-

spondent will suffer great inconvenience or loss by setting aside the default judgment.
5.

There has been no showing that the plaintiff

has gone to any considerable expense or sacrifice in
preparing for trial.
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6. There is no indication that by having a trial at a
date subsequent to February 23rd evidence will be lost.
In truth and fact the evidence is largely documentary
and can be entered in evidence at any time. All of the
material witnesses to the case are largely available in
Utah and will be none the less available if this case is
heard on its merits than they were at the time the default
judgment was entered.
1

Quoting again from Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
60 (h):
". . . the motion shall be made within a
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3) and
(4), not more than three n1onths after the judgment, orde-r or proceeding \Yas entered or taken."
Sub paragraph 7 states: ''the motion shall be made -w-ithin a reasonable time" and does not lin1it it to any particular number of days.
Again, it is important to recognize that the defendant
could not have acted more timely in response to his
default position, for if he had been only several hours
earlier the case would not be before this Court.
In the case of Ney v. Harrison, 5 Ut. 2d 217, 299 P.
2d, 1114, the Court said:
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"The statutory authority of trial courts to set
aside judgments obtained by default has been liberally construed to the end that there be trial on
the merits, beginning with our earliest decisions.
In the recent case of Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,
we had occasion to review the policy considerations and reaffirmed the attitude of liberal construction, thus :
''The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a
creature of equity designed to relieve against
harshness of enforc£ng a judgment, which may occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs
of the opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or defense."'
(Emphasis added.)
One of the factors considered by the Court in determining whether a default judgment should be set aside
is whether there is a material issue or a defense to the
complaint. In the instant case the affidavit attached to
the motion to set aside the judgment by default specifically enumerates in paragraphs 5 through 14 inclusive,
the defenses which could be raised upon trial. The Court
in Utah Commercial and Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 53 P.

1033, stated at page 1036:
"This raises a n1aterial issue, and if true, will
make a good defense. Conspiracy and collusion of
the bank officials with the mortgagors are also set
up with considerable detail. The defense indicated
is clearly meritorious, and, with a record replete
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with circumstances indicating that the purpose
and intention was to defend the action on its
merits, would it be reasonable or justifiable to infer that the defendant knowingly and intentionally
neglected his case~"
In the matter at hand, it is absurd to assume that the
defendant, having allegedly given $20,000.00 in stoctk to
the plaintiff-respondent, and approximately $34,000.00
in cash, desires to sit back and idly allow a judgment to be
entered whereby patent positions and contracts quite necessary for their operation will be taken from them. Especially should this be considered in light of the fact that
two royalty payments were forwarded to the plaintiffrespondent before notice of termination was mailed to the
plaintiff by the defendant. These checks were returned.
Continuing on with the case of J..T ey v. Rarr:VSon, the
Court at page 1036 states:
"Such is not the law, and courts do not favor
judgments by default. The policy of the law is that
every man shall have his day in court before the
judgment shall be entered against him, and where
a judg1nent by default has been entered, and within the proper ti1ne a good defense to the action
in which the judg1nent is rendered, is made to appear, and it is shown that the default "·as entered
through exmtsable neglect or n1istake, the default
will be vacated and the judg1nent set aside, to permit a trial on the 1nerits." (Emphasis added.)
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"'The power of the court to set aside the judgments by default is recognized and conferred in
Section 3005, Rev. St. 1898, and should be liberally
exercised for the purpose of directing proceedings
. . . and where the circmnstances which led to default are such as to cause the court to hesitate, it
is better to resolve the doubt in favor of the application, so that a trial may be secured on the
merits."
It cannot be said that the Court did not hesitate in
the case at bar, for as indicated in the Statement of Facts,
the Court in addressing its remarks to the parties, expressly stated, clearly evidencing its hesitation, that this
case should he placed on the trial calendar.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION IN THAT
THE DEFENDANT HAD NOT BEEN PROPERLY SERVED.

Under Rule 4 (e) 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the manner of service on a corporation is expressly outlined. It is to he served by the delivering of a copy
of the smnmons and complaint to an officer, a managing
or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
The plaintiff in attepting to secure service upon
Standard Gilsonite Company served R. J. Pinder as an
officer. R. J. Pinder, upon receiving the smnmons and
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complaint, categorically stated that he was not an officer, and that he was not employed by Standard Gilsonite.
The process servicer, however, under apparent instructions, served him, despite the advice that he was not an
officer, director or employee. Documentary evidence and
testimony as set forth in the affidavit of R. J. Pinder and
attached to the motion to set aside the default judgment,
clearly states that on January 18th, 1962, R. J. Pinder
resigned as an officer and director of Standard Gilsonite
Company. The service of summons was not made until
February 1st, 1962. Certainly, it cannot be contended,
under the circumstances here involved, that the service
of summons and complaint is in valid and proper form.
It would appear that there is no alternative but to insist
that the service was of no legal effect and that jurisdiction was not obtained over Standard Gilsonite Company,
for there is no evidence of any nature whatsoever in any
of the pleadings, to indicate that R. J. Pinder was in fact
an officer at the time of the filing of the complaint and
service of the summons. He was served, but he denies
being an officer or director, and judgment is taken
against Standard Gilsonite. At least, it would seem that
there is an issue which should be resolved concerning the
question of whether or not he was an officer at the time
of service, and the the trial court should allow the introduction of evidence to disprove the affidavit of Mr.
Pinder, rather than to summarily grant a default judgment, and a fortiori, in denying the n1otion for setting
aside, even on the basis of Rule 4 (e) 4 or Rule 60 (b),
sub section 4.
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The trial court commented in the Beaver Dam Sales
Company v. Standard Gilsonite Company transcript, the
con1panion case to the one here in issue, to the fact that
there was a question in mind of whether the officer,
when he resigned, must notify third parties. The law
on this particular point is clear. At 13 Am. Jur. Sec. 883
at page 867, the law is set forth as follows:
"An officer of a corporation may terminate
his office by resignation if the statutes, charter,
and by-laws impose no limitations thereon, and in
doing so, he need not give any notice to the public
or to persons dealing with the corporation. The
fact that a statute requires directors, unless removed, to continue in office until their successors
are appointed does not prevent a director from
resigning at any time. The right of an officer to
resign as regards third persons, however, is not
unqualified, and as against them the motive of a
resignation may render it ineffectual.''
There is not one scintilla of evidence in this file that
R. J. Pinder had any ulterior motive for resigning as an
officer and director of Standard Gilsonite Company, particularly as it relates to the case at hand. There is no
testimony or evidence that R. J. Pinder's resignation was

in any way motivated by any other desire than to simply
get out of Standard Gilsonite, which is at present an
insolvent corporation proceeding under the provisions
of Chapter XI of the Chandler Act. Even if there should
have been testimony or evidence to the effect that Pinder
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had indeed an ulterior motive in resigning as an officer
and director of Standard Gilsonite, this would be a question of fact for the court or jury to decide on the basis of
evidence presented before it, and therefore would he another issue to place before the court, and another reason
why this case should not have been defaulted. Certainly
with the record before the court it is apparent that jurisdiction, on the basis of the evidence presented to the
court, had not been obtained over the defendant, and the
court was in error in assuming that under the law, notice
of resignation of an officer and director must be given
to third parties. Acting under misinterpretation and
perhaps misunderstanding of the general rule of law, the
court heard and denied the motion to set aside the default
judgment.
The resignation generally becomes immediately effeetive, unless some provision in the resignation provides
otherwise. Again quoting from 13 Am. J ur. 886 at page
868, it states:
"According to son1e authorities, a resignation
by an officer of a corporation takes effect immediately and is not dependent upon the appointment
of a successor in office, even though a by-law provides that the office shall be held until a successor
is appointed. There are authorities, however,
which have taken the view that where the by-laws
provide that a corporate officer shall continue to
hold office until the election of his successor, the
resignation of suc.h an officer does not take effect
until then.''
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In this particular case, the counsel for the appellant
stipulates that the corporate charter and by-laws provide that an officer shall hold office until a successor is
appointed, but does not provide anything concerning resignations.
There IS evidence that R.J. Pinder's status as an
officer and director prior to his resignation is perhaps
questionable. If, however, the court ta:kes the position
of accepting the general rule of law, Mr. Pinder's resignation was effective and the service occurred at a time subsequent to his resignation. Again quoting from 13 Am.
Jur., Sec. 885, at page 868:
"Since an officer may resign, as a rule, at
pleasure, no action on the part of the corporation
is essential to 1nake his resignation effectual. Acceptance thereof by the directors or governing
body is not required. "\Vhen he tenders his resignation to the proper corporate authorities, to take
effect immediately, the resignation is con1plete, although it is not acted on by the corporation or
entered in its books."
In the instant case the letter of resignation was forwarded to all the responsible parties, primarily certain
majority stockholders and the one remaining director,
and all, in fact, who held responsible positions in this
corporation, were notified. Under these circumstances, it
would appear that no one can contend that as a matter
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of law the resignation was ineffective. To allow the
default judgment to stand where there is a serious question as to the court having obtained jurisdiction would be
a great injustice.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT BASED UPON FINDINGS OF AN ILLEGAL
CONTRACT, PREPARED BY THE PLAI~TIFF HIMSELF,
WITH MUTUAL PARTICIPATION, AND STILL ALLOWING
HIM ·TO RETAIN $54,000.00 IN PROFIT, AND GRANTING
JUDGMENT WHICH RE'TURNED THE PATENTS WHICH
WERE THE SUBJECT OF THE ALLEGED ILLEGAL CONTRACT.

The lower court erred in granting a default judgment
based upon a complaint which expressly alleges that the
action is based upon an illegal con tract, said contract being prepared with the consent and approval of plaintiff's
own counsel, who is, in fact, named in the agreement,
under the terms of which, over a period of approximately
four years, the plaintiff received in excess of $50,000.00,
and further the court erred in granting injunctive relief
in instructing the defendant to transfer back to the plaintiff the subject of an illegal contract.
Referring to the judgment and decree entered in this
case, paragraph 2 states :
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"The contract entered into between the plaintiff and defendant dated July 2nd, 1958, is illegal,
void and uninforceable."
On the basis of the finding of the contract to be void
and illegal, it is seemingly elementary law stated in the
Latin maxim ex dodo malo non oritur actio, which, freely
translated, means "no court will lend its aid to a man who
found his claim of action upon an immoral or illegal
act."
Quoting from 12 Am. Jur. on Contracts at Sec. 209,
at page 713:
"In other words no action can be based upon
an illegal agreement. The rule rests upon the
broad ground that no court will allow itself to be
used when its judgment will consumate an act
forbidden by law. It has its foundation in the
policy of discouraging illegal and corrupt agreements by refusing all judicial aid to the parties
to them. This rule applies to any agreement which
is illegal. . . ."
Generally, limitations on enforcement of rights growing out of legal agreements are applied in cases where
parties are in pari delicto. It should be noted that this
contract has persisted since 1958 and certainly if the contract were illegal, the plaintiff knew, or should have
known, of its character. The contract on its face shows
no apparent illegality, no illegal object is known, and
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certainly illegality cannot be presumed or inferred. If
illegal, the plaintiff during the period of time accepted
the rather substantial benefits thereunder, alleged to be
in ,excess of $50,000.00, and cannot reasonably contend
at this point that he is not in pari delicto, and certainly no evidence was presented to the lower court negating or even alleging that they were not.
It is entirely possible, and only sufficient evidence
will prove, that only the plaintiff who asserts illegality
had :knowledge of the purported illegality and under these
circumstances it is elementary that the courts have a duty
to protect the innocent party and, if necessary, to penalize
the party guilty of attempting to accomplish an illegal
objective by entirely legal means.
Certainly if the courts did not punish the guilty party
they would at least require the restitution of the monies
paid.

12 Am. Jur. Sec. 213 states at page 72-±:
"It is son1etimes said that a party to an illegal
agreement will not be pern1itted to avail hin1self
of its illegality until he restores to the other party
all that has been received fron1 such party on the
illegal agreement, and that so long as he continues
to enjoy the bene,fits of the agree1nent, he will not
be allowed to set up its nullity."
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Concluding this aspect of the argun1ent, if it can be
shown that the defendant had no knowledge of the illegal
objective or the illegality of the contract, such sums as
those received by the plaintiff herein, with the (knowledge
of illegality, should be returned to the defendant herein
prior to the maintaining of an action upon an alleged
illegal contract. If, on the other hand, the parties are in
pari ,delicto, the court should refuse to give any aid or
comfort to either party and accordingly deny any action.
In this case, however, the court granted injunctive relief,
together with an order to the defendant to transfer the
subject of the contract, and a money judgment for costs,
based upon an illegal contract.
It should be noted, however, and perhaps made the
subject of an independent argument, that the judgment
and degree is cornpletely at odds with any rule of law in
that it on one hand finds the contract void and declare it
as such in pargaraph 2, and in paragraph 4 indicates that
if it is not void then it is terminated because of defaults of the defendant. These two provisions cannot
stand together. If a contract is void it cannot be terminated, it cannot be defaulted, if it never existed, and accordingly that judgment and decree is erroneous on its
face.
Quoting from Willian1 L. Clark, Jr., in his Handbook
on the Law of Contracts, \Vest Publishing Co., 1931, the
basic rule of law is cited in this general principle:
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"To result in a contract, an agreement must
create an obligation; and it does not create an
obligation if it is such that the courts cannot enforce it. An agreement, therefore, which is illegal
or unlawful, is, in fact, no contract at all though
it is often spoken of as an illegal contract."
Without burdening the court with details regarding
what constitutes an illegal contract, it is clear from the
law that what constitutes an illegal contract is very limited in scope. There is some general allegation in the plaintiff's complaint that interstate commerce is involved without any express allegation of why, or why its involvement
with interstate commerce renders it illegal. Counsel
herein submits that there is very little done in business
affairs that does not in some way involve interstate commerce. No hint, therefore, can be drawn from its pleading establishing anything illegal.
See 12 Am. J ur., Sec. 150 at page 643, which states:
"The illegality of an agree1nent may be in the
consideration, in a pron1ise, or in its perfonnance.
An agreement to do an illegal act is illegal. Usually the element that destroys the validity of an
agreen1ent is the purpose of the parties to accomplish or to aid an unlawful object. An agreement
which discloses an intention to contravene a statute in fraud of the public or to the injury of
private parties savors of a conspiracy and its
vicious and unenforceable. If such an intention
is once found to exist, the law cannot presun1e that
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the agreement is without the effect intended by the
parties in order to confer upon it the quality of
enforceability.
"It is sometimes stated that the lawfulness of
an agreement is to be measured by what is intended.''
The general law being outlined as heretofore, we now
address ourselves to cases in jurisdictions called
upon to decide the issue as it relates to the sufject of
illegality.
In the case of Smith et al. v. California Thorn Cordage, 18 P.2d 393, at page 396, citing Domenvgoni v. hnperial Live Stock, 189 Cal. 467, 209 P. 36 to 39, the court
said:
"But it does not follow that the plaintiff was
entitled to any relief. The entire transaction was
an attempt to circumvent the law ... In such a case
the court will give no relief even if the point is not
raised by either party."
and thereafter in the case is a rather thorough analysis
of this subject. Quoting from paragraph 4 of that case
at 396, the court said:
"lTnder the foregoing authorities, where the
parties to an illegal con tract are in pari delicto,
the courts will not, on the one hand, undo what
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has been done, nor on the other, perfect what has
been left unfinished.''
Quoting again and focusing upon the fact that the
foregoing case raise·s the problem with which the court
is herein concerned, in paragraphs 5 and 6 of that case,
the court said:
"It may be true that the defendant, John C.
Thorn, is not seeking relief under the terms of
the contract. What he is trying to do is to restore
his own status quo by taking from the other parties property which he had transferred under an
illegal agreement, pursuant to its terms and conditions, something which, in this particular action,
is not wholly inequitable, but contrary to the express policy of the law."
It is the contention of the defendant appellant that
there were and are substantial defenses to this action
whether upon the basis of breach of contract or more particularly upon the basis of illegality, and it is contended
by the defendant that the purpose for the effort on the
part of the plaintiff to terminate the rights under the contract is as a result of dealing ,,-ith a n1ajor company
and negotiating the sale of the rights held by the defendant to that cmnpany. The defendant is prepared to submit at trial a letter written to the plaintiff, l\1r.

~Iayhew,

on June 23rd, 1961, frmn the attorney representing a substantial cmnpany, which letter states:
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''To carry out this purpose, I have prepared
and enclosed two copies of an agreement for your
review. Both copies have been executed by the
proper officers of * * * Company and if acceptable
to you, will you please execute both copies and return one copy to me. Basically, the agreement
provides for you to grant *** an exclusive license
in the e'vent, and only in the event, that Standard
(the defendant herein) should default under its
agreement of July 2, 1958, with you provided as a
result of such default you demand and obtain reassignment of the intention and the reassignment
document being held in escrow by the Security
Title Company of Salt La.ke City, Utah.''
Correspondence of the kind quoted certainly evidences no illegality whatever but points up the obvious
efforts on the part of E. J. l\fayhew to negotiate a sale of
the rights which had been sold to Standard and had to be
retrieved in order to consumate the subsequent sale. Both
Mayhew and the corporation by whom the letter quoted
was written held contractual relations with Standard involving the alleged illegal contract. The agreement is
acknowledged in the letter by the company. It is contended
that the position to be negotiated to the company who
wrote the letter is substantially the same position as that
which was sold to Standard, which would imply that the
illegality of the arrangement in question is not such that
:Jf r. :Mayhew is not willing to sell it again. This letter

was written months prior to the filing of the action on
the contract to terminate the rights of Standard.
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From the foregoing arguments as a matter of law,
the Trial Court erred in granting relief to the plaintiff.
The findings of fact and judgment are stated in the alternative in declaring the contract void and also declaring it
breached. It cannot he both. Further, in the granting of
the judgment on a contract alleged to be illegal which
gives injunctive relief. The contract under which the
plaintiff asserts his rights and cause of action by his own
allegations is adjudged illegal and he has received under
the terms of that contract and retained the same, the sum
of $54,000 in benefits, then asks the court to cancel
the contract allowing him to retain the benefits and retrieved the subject of his illegal bargain.
Defendant for its stockholders petitioned the court
for an opportunity to be heard and it was denied. It is the
contention of the appellant herein that it is entitled to its
day in court on any one of the three points of this argument.
CONCL,USION
In conclusion it is submitted:
1.

That the Trial Court has obviously abused its

discretion in not granting the defendant's motion to set
aside the plaintiff's findings of fact and conclusions of
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deavored, with reasonable diligence after being guilty of
excusable neglect, in filing their motion to set aside the
default judgment, and at that time disclosing by affidavit numerous meritorious defenses.
2. That the court never obtained jurisdiction over
the defendant corporation. There are disputed facts in
the record that no officer or authorized agent was served
as required by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
that the court was mistaken in its understanding of the
effectiveness of the resignation in question, and further
that the plaintiff could properly have served the Seeretary of State in accordance with the rules, it being apparent that there was no one upon whom service could
properly be made.
3. That the judgment here involved is inconsistent
on its face and is based upon a contract which the plaintiff alleges as being illegal. If the contract is illegal as
alleged, the court under la''T cannot give aid, comfort
or assistance to a party who bases an action upon an
illegal eontract. There is no testimony in the record to
indicate that there is anything particularly invalid, illegal or against public policy in this contract. If it were
illegal, then the court should have refused to hear the
case, or in any event, have given no relief whatever. That
deciding the issue of legality or illegality, and the finding
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legal agreement, is to conclude that one is guilty of a
crime without evidence and then denying him the opportunity to be heard.
4. That upon equity, reason, logic and good conscience, the appellant herein should prevail under these
facts, and that such a result is supported by the weight
of authority and the cases.
5. That the plaintiff by alleging illegality and stating that the contract was void from the beginning, is now
retaining under the terms of the purported void contract,
the sum of $54,000.00 in cash or its equivalent, and certainly at the very least, he should be obliged to tender
back that which he has received under a void contract,
if it is illegal, and the defendant not in pari delicto.
1

6. The trial court erred in entering its findings of
fact and conclusions of law and judgment in favor of the
respondent, and by denying the defendant's motion to set
aside the default judgment.
Let it therefore follow that the judgment should be
reversed and the matter re1nanded to the District Court
for a trial on its merits.
Respectfully subn1i tted,
BRUCE E. COKE
Counsel for Defendant Appellant
513 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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